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Prior

Inconsistent
Statements

by Witnesses
in Maryland
by Byron Warnken

The general rule is that prior inconsistent statements of a witness are inadmissible as substantive evidence because of
the hearsay rule, and the prior inconsistent statement can only be used for the
purpose of impeaching the credibility of
the witness. The prior inconsistent
statement, under this traditional view, is
hearsay because it was not taken under
oath, is not subject to cross-examination,
and was not taken in the presence of the
trier of fact. The contra, more modem,
minority view is that an oath does not
guarantee trustworthiness of testimony,
that the declarant can be crossexamined, and that the trier of fact can
observe and judge the demeanor of the
witness on the stand. (McCormick on
Evidence § 251)
Maryland follows the traditional view
that prior inconsistent statements are not
probative evidence on the merits and are
not to be treated as having any substantive or independent testimonial value.
(Wilson v. State, 20 Md. App. 318, 326
(1974); Kraft v. Freedman, 15 Md. App.
187, 195-96 (1972); Sun Cab Co. v.
Walston, 15 Md. App. 113, 135 (1972);
Westv. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244,
253 (1953). Although not admissible as
substantive evidence, the prior inconsistent statement made by a witness is admissible for the purpose of impeaching
the credibility of the witness. (Sun Cab
Co., Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354,
361-62 (1956); Parks v. State, 113 Md.

338, 340 (1910). This includes the witness' testimony from a previous trial.
(Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 485
(1939).
To pursue the impeachment process,
the inconsistency between the prior
statement and the testimony at the trial
must pertain to a material issue. (Sun
Cab Co. v. Walston, 15 Md. App. 113,
132; Joppy v. Hopkins, 231 Md. 52, 56
(1962). In addition, before the prior inconsistent statement can be admitted for
impeachment purposes, a proper foundation must be laid, by asking the witness on cross-examination whether he
or she had made such contradictory
statement to a designated person and
apprising the witness of the time and
place when the statement was supposed
to have been made. (Cooper v. State, 14
Md. App. 106, 111 (1972); Estep v.
State, 14Md. App. 53, 70 (1972); Sanders v. State, 1 Md. App. 630, 640-42
(1967); Campbell v. patton, 227 Md.
125, 141 (1961). Where the priorinconsistent statement was verbal, the witness'
attention must be called to the statement, with a specification of the time and
place, so that the witness may be given
an opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement, and so that it may be determined whether there is actually an inconsistency. (Baltimore Transit Co. v.
State ex. rei. Castranda, 194 Md. 421,
433 (1950). If the witness states that he
does not recall making the alleged prior
inconsistent statement, it is competent to
prove that the statement was made and
to let the jury consider such proof in estimating the credit to be given to the testimony of the witness. (Leister v. State,
136 Md. 518, 523 (1920). Thus, impeaching evidence may be offered if the
witness denies having made the previous statement, or if he states that he does
not remember whether he made it.
If the witness making the contradictory statement is one's own witness, an
additional criterion exists because of the
general rule that a party may not impeach his own witness. In this case, the
party calling the witness must first satisfy
the Court that he has been taken by surprise, and that the testimony is contrary
to what he had a right to expect. If the
Court is so satisfied, it may allow the

party to question the witness in a leading
manner; this is to elicit proof of the prior
inconsistent statement to show that the
party calling the witness has been surprised by the witness' testimony, why
the witness was called, and that the witness was called in good faith. These prior
inconsistent statements are, of course,
not probative evidence. (Green v. State,
243 Md. 154, 157-58 (1966).
A witness whose testimony has become suspect by a showing of prior inconsistent statements may rehabilitate
himself by offering evidence of other
statements made by him which are in accord with his testimony or by explaining
the reasons for any such inconsistencies.
(Virginia Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Montgomery, 256Md. 221, 226 (1969).
The witness may thus render his prior
statements consistent, or there may exist
a situation of prior statements having
been consistent all along. In either case,
the prior consistent statements, like the
prior inconsistent statements, have no
substantive value, but only credibility
value. In the case of the prior consistent
statement, there is no need to look to the
prior statement for substantive value in
any event, since its consistent
counterpart - the testimony at the
trial - is substantive evidence.
The witness' prior statement may contain "A". In court he may say "8" when
questioned by the party calling him. The
party calling him will claim surprise, and
upon laying the proper foundation, will
be permitted to bring in the prior statement "A", not as substantive evidence,
but to show why the witness was called.
Once the surprise phase has been concluded, firect examination will resume,
whereupon the witness may say "A".
Now "A" is substantive evidence, not
through its prior statement form, but
through its probative value as direct testimony. (Tates v. State, Md. App. No.
624 (unreported) (1974).
These rules as to prior statements
apply only to a witness. There is a wide
difference between the declaration of an
ordinary witness, a stranger to the case,
and the declaration of a party to the record. The latter, being the admissions of
a party to the record against his interest,
are substantive evidence and may be
offered to prove the truth of the matters

thus admitted. (Smith v. Branscome,
251 Md. 582,589 (1968); Wolfe v. State
ex. rei. Brown, 173 Md. 103, 110
(1937); Bartlett v. Wilbur, 53 Md. 485,
497-98 (1880);M.L.E.Evidence § 141).
A related area is the difference between a memorandum of past recollection recorded and a memorandum used
to revive present recollection. A past recollection recorded is used in a situation
where a witness, who is either devoid of
a present recollection or possessed of an
imperfect present recollection, desires to
use a past recollection. The witness must
identify the memorandum as made immediately after, or contemporaneously
with, the event, and that the memorandum is a correct statement of those facts
which the witness recorded. It must be
adduced from the witness that he or she
at one time had personal knowledge of
the facts, that the writing was, when
made, an accurate record of the event,
and that after seeing the writing, he has
not sufficient present independent recollection of the facts to testify accurately in
regard thereto. Present recollection re-

vived involves the use, by a witness, of a
writing or other object to refresh his recollection so that he may testify about
events from present recollection. The
memorandum in the former instance has
substantive value; in the latter it does
not. (Askins v. State, 13 Md. App. 702,
709-10 (1971).
Although Maryland recognizes and
continues to reaffirm the principle that a
substantive fact cannot be established by
impeachment of a witness, not a party to
the suit, by previous contradictory
statements, both the Court of Special
Appeals and the Court of Appeals have
acknowledged the existence of a contra
minority view. (Wilson v. State, 20 Md.
App. 318, 326-27 (1974); Kraft v.
Freedman, 15 Md. 187, 195-96 (1972);
Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 583 (1956);
Westv. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244,
253). This view permits the substantive
use of prior inconsistent statements on
the theory that the usual dangers of
hearsay are largely nonexistent where
the witness testifies at trial. Having been
urged by most legal commentators, this

view finds expression in current proposals to codify the law of evidence and has
been adopted in some jurisdictions.
The America Law Institute Model
Code of Evidence Rule 503 (a) proVides
that evidence of a hearsay declaration is
admissible if the judge finds that the declarant is present and subject to crossexamination.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence Rule
63 (1) provides that a statement previously made by a person who is present at
the hearing and available for crossexamination, is substantively admissible
provided the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying
as a witness. The comment to the rule
contends that when sentiment is laid
aside there is little basis for objection to
this enlightened modification of the rule
against hearsay.
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801
(d) (1) provides that prior statements by
a witness are not hearsay if the declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement.
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Some form of the above three rules is
now used not only in the federal court
system, but also in several state jurisdictions (e.g., California, Kansas, Kentucky, New Jersey, Utah). In addition,
Wisconsin, without the aid of a statute or
general rule of court, has held that prior
inconsistent written statements, made by
a witness who is in court and subject to
cross-examination, are admissible not
only for impeachment, but also for substantive evidence. (Gelhaar v. State, 41
Wis.2d 230 (1970).
Concerning the constitutionality of
admitting prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence, the Supreme

:

Court said that the confrontation clause
of the Sixth Amendment, as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, is not violated by
admitting a declarant's out-of-court
statements, as long as he is testifying as a
witness at trial and is subject to full
cross-examination. The court said that
the purposes of the Amendment are
satisfied at the time of trial, even if not before, since the witness is under oath, is
subject to cross-examination, and his
demeanor can be observed by the trier
of fact. (Califomia v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 153-64 (1970).

In Maryland, in addition to the Court
of Appeals' 1974 reaffirmation of its
adherence to the traditional view prohibiting prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence (Wilson v. State,
20 Md. App. 318, 326-27 (1974), it is
noted that the 1975 regular session of
the General Assembly received no bills
proposing statutory eVidentiary rules.
Thus, there is nothing at the present time
to indicate to the bar or the bench that
Maryland will adopt the modern minority, yet apparently ever-growing, view
that prior inconsistent statements can be
used as substantive evidence.
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